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Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell to Tame
the Doctrine of Equivalents
Matthew C. Phillips*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of equivalents creates uncertainty in the scope of
patent rights, spawns litigation, and clashes with other doctrines of
patent law, namely the requirement for clarity of notice and the
provisions for reissue of defective patents. For these reasons,
many have attempted to criticize, limit and even abolish the
doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine has more or less withstood
all attacks and is a permanent fixture in patent law for the
foreseeable future, because it serves an important purpose -bolstering patent protection in circumstances that would otherwise
undermine the incentive to innovate and disclose technology via
patenting.
This paper analyzes the law and policies animating the doctrine
of equivalents and other patent law doctrines with which it clashes.
This paper proposes a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents that
minimizes these clashes in a manner that furthers the goals of the
patent system while fairly balancing the equitable interests of the
parties involved. Part I of the paper provides basic background
about the doctrine of equivalents. Part II reviews the tensions
between the doctrine of equivalents and the notice function of
claims. Part III presents reissue proceedings as a preferable
alternative to the doctrine of equivalents. Part IV proposes that the
doctrine of equivalents should be reserved only for after-arising
technology, with justification based on an extension of the
dedication rule of Maxwell v. Baker.1 Finally, Part IV contrasts the
proposal’s justification from Part IV with other justifications that
have been advanced in support of the same proposal.

*

The author is a patent agent and law clerk at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in
Washington, D.C. Formerly a practicing engineer and a patent examiner, he holds
bachelor, master and doctorate degrees in electrical engineering from the University of
Utah. He will receive the J.D. degree from Georgetown University Law Center in 2001.
He acknowledges the helpful guidance from adjunct professors Nancy Linck and Scott
Chambers, for whose course this paper was first prepared.
1
Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IS A JUDICIALLY CREATED
DOCTRINE THAT EXTENDS THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE BEYOND THE
LINGUISTIC LIMITS OF A CLAIM
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially-created doctrine that
extends the right to exclude beyond the linguistic limits of a patent
claim.2 Although the doctrine of equivalents does not extend or
expand claim scope,3 it does provide patent rights that are different
from the literal language of the claims. When there is no literal
infringement, the doctrine of equivalents is invoked by considering
the differences between the accused article/process and the literal
meaning of the claims.4 Generally, if the differences are
“insubstantial,” then the accused device/process is said to be
infringing.5 Various factors are pertinent to the issue of whether
the differences are substantial. These factors include known
interchangeability, the purpose of the different part of the accused
device, the qualities of the different part of the accused device
when combined with other parts, and the function that it performs.6
In particular, a popular test for equivalence of mechanical
differences is the function-way-result test, by which the differences
between two things are insubstantial if they perform substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the
same result.7
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is typically
determined by a jury. The determination of whether a given part
of an accused device is insubstantially different from an element of
a patent claim is a question of fact.8 The fact finder reaches the
issue of equivalence in fact unless one of the legal doctrines
described in Part B, infra, precludes infringement under the

2
See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
3
See id.
4
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1875 (1997).
5
See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22
(Fed. Cir. 1995), acq. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875.
6
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85
U.S.P.Q. 328, 330-31 (1950).
7
See Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875.
8
See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 331. See also WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37-38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874-75.
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doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law.9
A. The Rationale for the Doctrine of Equivalents is Preventing
Competitors From Easily Avoiding Infringement by
Strengthening Patent Rights and thus Further Encouraging
Innovation and Disclosure
The doctrine of equivalents serves an important purpose:
[C]ourts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a
patented invention which does not copy every literal
detail would be to convert the protection of the patent
grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation
would leave room for – indeed encourage – the
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and
insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent
which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take
the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the
reach of law. One who seeks to pirate an invention, like
one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may
be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and
shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a
dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no
other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism
and would be subordinating substance to form. It would
deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would
foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions,
which is one of the primary purposes of the patent
system.10

9
See The Honorable Paul R. Michel, Speech of the Honorable Paul R. Michel Given
to the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 139, 140
(1999).
10
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330. See also Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d
at 1532 (Newman, J., concurring) (“If minor improvements are likely to be captured by
the doctrine of equivalents, . . . the doctrine of equivalents, like the grant of broad claims,
could encourage ‘leapfrogging’ advances instead of minor improvements and substantial
imitation.”).
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B. The Doctrine of Equivalents is Limited by Prior Art,
Prosecution History Estoppel, the “All-Elements” Rule and
Public Dedication
Four doctrines limit application of the doctrine of equivalents.
First, prior art limits the scope of equivalents to that which is novel
and nonobvious over the prior art.11 One conceptual method for
testing whether this limit has been reached, first involves
construction of a hypothetical claim that would literally cover the
accused device/process.12 Next, the hypothetical claim is tested for
patentability in terms of novelty and nonobviousness over the prior
art.13
Second, the prosecution history of a patent can limit the doctrine
of equivalents by estopping a patentee from recapturing, as an
equivalent, subject matter surrendered during prosecution before
the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).14 The rationale for
prosecution history estoppel is that patent examiners and the
public, by inspection of the prosecution history, reasonably rely
upon the representation by the patent applicant that subject matter
is being surrendered.15 At this time, more exact contours of
prosecution history estoppel are being considered by the Federal
Circuit in the case of Festo v. SMC.16
A third limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is the “allelements” rule, which precludes from permissible equivalents
those that are only equivalent to the claimed invention as a
whole.17 The all-elements rule forces the equivalence analysis to
11

See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1948-49.
Id.
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (1997).
15
See Haynes Int’l, Inc. v. Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), on rehearing, 15 F.3d 1076, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1958 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also
Mark I Marketing Corp. v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 66 F.3d 285, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1095
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
16
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 1382,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1959, 1960 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (withdrawing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1999))
(rehearing en banc ordered with briefing requested on issues of: (1) whether amendments
not traversing art rejections create estoppel; (2) whether voluntary amendments create
estoppel; (3) the range of equivalents available when estoppel is explicitly present; and
(4) the range of equivalents available when estoppel is presumed.).
17
See generally Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 41
12
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proceed on a more focused, element-by-element basis. The allelements rule has been emphasized by the Supreme Court as an
important tool for preventing overreaching of the doctrine of
equivalents.18 Presently, there is uncertainty in the law as to what
is an “element” for purposes of this rule. Festo v. SMC will likely
address this issue as well.19
A fourth limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is a limitation
against recapturing, by equivalents, subject matter that was
disclosed but unclaimed, and thus not regarded by the applicant as
her invention during prosecution of the patent application.20 This
limitation is discussed in detail in Part V infra.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS FRUSTRATES THE NOTICE
FUNCTION OF CLAIMS
A. The Patent Statute Requires That Claims Give Clear Notice to
Competitors
The patent statute requires that the claims of a patent
“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” what the applicant
considers to be his invention.21 There are at least two reasons that
this requirement was included in the Patent Act. First, claims that
particularly and distinctly define the periphery of an invention help
focus examination and facilitate meaningful prosecution of patent
applications to arrive at issued claims that ideally are carefully
tailored to protect the invention as much as possible within the
requirements of patentability.22 Indeed, the system of patent
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865.
18
See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-25, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869.
19
See Festo, 187 F.3d at 1382, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1960 (briefing also requested on the
effect of the all-elements rule in this case).
20
See Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
21
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
22
See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2173, 6th ed., rev. 3 (1997).
The primary purpose of this requirement of definiteness of claim language is to
ensure that the scope of the claims is clear so the public is informed of the
boundaries of what constitutes infringement of the patent. A secondary purpose
is to provide a clear measure of what applicants regard as the invention so that it
can be determined whether the claimed invention meets all the criteria for
patentability and whether the specification meets the criteria of 35 U.S.C. 112,
first paragraph, with respect to the claimed invention.
Id.
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procurement in the United States is based upon the notion that
pending claims give notice to the patent examiner as to the extent
of the patent rights sought by the applicant.
A second and more important reason for the requirement of
section 112 of Title 35 of the U.S.C., second paragraph, is that it
allows competitors to discern with some certainty the scope of the
patent rights of issued patents so that the competitors can plan their
activities to conform with the law.23 The phrase “the notice
function” is most often used to refer to this second situation, and it
is that sense that is the subject of this paper.
B. Clear Notice of Patent Rights to Competitors is Socially
Desirable
In the realm of claim construction, the courts have emphasized
the importance of the notice function of claims. In Markman v.
Westview Instruments Inc.24 (hereinafter “Markman I”), the
Federal Circuit sitting en banc stated:
It is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors
be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of
the patentee’s right to exclude. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94
U.S. 568, 573-74 (1877) (“It seems to us that nothing can
be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the
public, than that the former should understand, and
correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for
what he claims a patent.”). They may understand what is
the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining the
patent and prosecution history—”the undisputed public
record”—and applying established rules of construction
to the language of the patent claim in the context of the
patent. Moreover, competitors should be able to rest
assured, if infringement litigation occurs, that a judge,
trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the
patent and its associated public record and apply the
established rules of construction, and in that way arrive at
23

See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28-29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1871.
52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (hereinafter
“Markman I”), aff’d, Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1996) (hereinafter “Markman II”).
24
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the true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights
to be given legal effect.25
The Supreme Court echoed the same concern in Markman v.
Westview Instruments Inc.26 (hereinafter “Markman II”), as one of
the “functional considerations” that compels claim construction by
the courts.27 In Markman II, Justice Souter quoted two cases for a
similar proposition, as follows:
“[T]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection
of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive
genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the
patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S.
364, 369 (1938). Otherwise, a “zone of uncertainty
which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at
the risk of infringement [of] claims would discourage
invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure
of the field[.]” United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).28
C. The Penumbra of Equivalents Frustrates the Notice Function
The preceding statements by the two highest courts of patent law
seem to have been written as if there were no doctrine of
equivalents, because the claims alone, no matter how they are
interpreted, do not completely define “the patent owner’s rights”
(the phrase used in Markman I). “The patent owner’s rights” are
the rights to exclude others from making, using, selling, etc., what
the claims literally cover plus their equivalents under the doctrine
of equivalents.29 The scope of equivalents cannot be determined
from the “undisputed public record” (another phrase from
Markman I). Furthermore, the determination of equivalence
usually is not decided by a judge.30 Rather, equivalence is a
25

Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329 (emphasis added).
517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1996).
27
Id. at 388, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470.
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies:
The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV.
183, 191 (1999).
30
See Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461.
26
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question of fact that a jury often decides.31
For the same reasons that claim construction should be
predictable and certain, the scope of infringing activity should also
be predictable and certain. Literal infringement meets this goal.
Indeed, there is usually little dispute regarding literal infringement
after a claim construction is settled.32 However, the doctrine of
equivalents takes us away from this goal. The doctrine of
equivalents sacrifices some certainty for the sake of equity.33 The
doctrine of equivalents frustrates certainty on many levels,
including legal issues and factual issues.
There are presently legal uncertainties in the doctrine of
equivalents,34 and satisfactory resolution of these legal
uncertainties is unlikely. For example, the hypothetical claim
exercise for determining when an equivalent runs afoul of prior
art,35 though theoretically satisfying, is awkward in practice and
rarely invoked.36 As another example, the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel is gray in areas regarding “patentability,” other
than patentability over prior art, as to whether voluntary
amendments create estoppel and the range of equivalents available
when estoppel is present. Though these issues are unsettled at this
time, the courts should be able to articulate certain and satisfactory
guidelines for these aspects of prosecution history estoppel.
However, the all-elements rule is much more troubling. The
definition of an “element” is slippery and probably cannot be
settled without some resort to arbitrariness. Presently, an element
seems to be more than just a single word, but potentially less than
an entire step in a method or an entire constituent part of an
apparatus (as is typically demarcated by semicolons).37 It is quite
possible that the courts will settle on a totality of circumstances
approach for determining whether a given word or phrase is an
31

See id.
See Markman I, 52 F.3d at 989, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337 (Mayer, J., concurring)
(“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.”).
33
See Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme
Court’s Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection - Certainty Conundrum, 14
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (1998).
34
See Festo, 187 F.3d 1381, 1381, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1959, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
35
See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
36
John R. Thomas, Lecture at the Patent & Trademark Office (Spring 1997).
37
See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
32
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“element” or not, and such a result will add further uncertainty to
the doctrine of equivalents. Given that the Supreme Court has
placed so much importance on the all-elements rule as a means for
curtailing broad application of the doctrine of equivalents,38
defects in the all-elements rule will propagate through to affect the
doctrine of equivalents significantly.
In addition to the legal uncertainties behind the doctrine of
equivalents, there are numerous factual uncertainties in any case.
First, under the function-way-result test for substantiality of
differences, many possible functions, ways, and results are
possible. Plaintiffs invariably argue for broader functions, ways,
and results, while defendants argue for narrower ones.39 The
formulations of a function, way, and result become additional
issues to litigate.
Perhaps the biggest uncertainty regarding the doctrine of
equivalents is that the decision can be made by a jury.40 Markman
II confirms that the right to a jury trial is required by the Seventh
Amendment, and that the jury’s role is only to decide the ultimate
infringement issues.41 Of course, summary judgment is possible
when the facts are such that no reasonable jury could find against
the weight of the evidence or when certain legal issues like the
prior art limits, prosecution history estoppel, the all-elements rule,
or the dedication rule preclude a finding of infringement by
equivalents.42 In fact, there appears to be a movement towards use
of these tools by the court (as opposed to the jury) to resolve issues
under the doctrine of equivalents.43 Perhaps this movement is due
to the court’s (particularly the Federal Circuit’s) sense that greater
predictability is needed in this area of the law.
38

See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 24-25, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1869 (1997).
See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1114 (1998).
40
See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950). See also
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35-39, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874-75.
41
Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1996).
42
See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24-25, 39 n.8, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869, 1876 n.8.
See also Sage Prod. Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1103,
1106 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
43
See Peter J. Ayers, Armed and Ready: Defending Patent Infringement Claims by
Summary Judgment, 8 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 421, 439 (1999). See also Jon
D. Grossman & Eric Oliver, A Step-By-Step Guide to Prosecuting Business Method
Patents, 17 No. 3 COMPUTER LAW. 6, 6 (March 2000) (“The current trend toward liming
the scope of equivalents (under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (¶ 6) and under the Doctrine of
Equivalents . . . .”).
39

PHILLIPS.FINAL

164

12/28/00 7:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:155

D. Frustration of the Notice Function Due to a Far-Reaching
Doctrine of Equivalents Causes Business Uncertainty, Stifles
“Designing Around” Innovations and Breeds Litigation
Uncertainty as to application of the doctrine of equivalents, like
uncertainty as to claim construction, makes it more difficult for a
competitor to determine the extent of patent rights.44 This in turn
makes it more difficult for the competitor to plan its activities (e.g.,
negotiate for a license, expect litigation, and predict the results of
litigation). Patent practitioners feel the force of this uncertainty
when they must provide an opinion as to whether a client is
infringing a patent or not. This uncertainty can result in a less
efficient system of competition.
Uncertainty as to application of the doctrine of equivalents also
makes it less likely that a competitor will expend resources to
“design around” patents,45 i.e., find ways to achieve the advantage
of the invention or solve the problem addressed by the invention
without infringing the patent claims. If patent rights could be
determined with certainty from the public record, a competitor
might be more willing to invest in efforts to design around the
patent rights. However, when the patent rights are less certain, a
competitor must take a greater risk to allocate resources in an
attempt to design around the patent rights. Lack of attempts to
design around patents is undesirable for society for two reasons:
first, designing around patents creates competition via cross
elasticity of demand where a patent has foreclosed competition;
second, designing around patent rights is in itself a form of
innovation.46 The overall goal of the patent system is to encourage
innovation and its disclosure.47 On one hand, the stronger patent
44
See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1535-36
(Newman, J., concurring) (Fed. Cir. 1995).
45
Cf. id. (listing four pairs of factually similar cases in which opposite
determinations of equivalency were found, prompting the statement: “It is not the
doctrine of equivalents, but the uncertainty of its application, that causes the uncertainty
in commercial relationships.”).
46
See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“We have
often noted that one of the benefits of the patent system is the incentive it provides for
‘designing around’ patented inventions, thus creating new innovations.”). See also
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent system works
to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional
purpose.”).
47
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
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rights that accompany a more expansive doctrine of equivalents is
an incentive to innovate. On the other hand, stifling designing
around activities suppresses an important source of downstream
innovation.48
Finally, uncertainty of any form breeds litigation. This is
certainly true in patent law.49 Disputes are less likely to settle in
the face of a disputable factual question, such as whether an
accused device or process is equivalent to a patent claim.

U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public
to practice the invention once the patent expires.”).
48
See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36, 224 U.S.P.Q.
418, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Cf. ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (1999)
[B]eyond some level copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by
raising the cost of expression . . . Creating a new work typically involves
borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works, as well as adding
original expression to it. A new work of fiction, for example, will contain the
authors expressive contributions but also characters, situations, plot details, and
so on, invented by previous authors. Similarly, a new work of music may
borrow tempo changes and chord progressions from earlier works. The less
extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator
can borrow from previous works without infringing copyright and thus lower,
therefore, the costs of creating a new work. Of course, even if copyright
protection effectively prevented all unauthorized copying from a copyrighted
work, authors would still copy. But they would copy works whose copyright
protection had run out, or they would disguise their copying, engage in costly
searches to avoid copying protected works, or incur licensing and other
transaction costs to obtain permission to copy such works. The effect would be
to raise the cost of creating new works – the cost of expression, broadly defined
– and thus, paradoxically, perhaps lower the number of works created.
Id.
49
See Scott R. Boalick, Note, The Dedication Rule and The Doctrine of Equivalents:
A Proposal for Reconciliation, 87 GEO. L.J. 2363, 2365 n.22 (1999) (citing Richard L.
Wynne, Jr., Patent Law: Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.: How Can
the Federal Circuit Control the Doctrine of Equivalents Following the Supreme Court’s
Refusal to Set the Standard?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 444-45 (1997) and James R. Farrand
& Ronald L. Johnston, Expanded Doctrine of Equivalents Extends Patents Old and New,
14 No. 6 COMPUTER LAW 1, 9-10 (1997)).
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III. REISSUE SHOULD BE PREFERRED OVER RESORT TO THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS BECAUSE REISSUE PRESERVES THE
NOTICE FUNCTION OF CLAIMS
Statutory reissue provisions allow a patentee to correct “defects”
in patents in a proceeding at the PTO.50 A correctable defect is
claiming too little in an original patent.51 However, broad
application of the doctrine of equivalents is a disincentive for a
patentee to pursue a reissue patent. A patentee with literal claim
scope that is too narrow is likely to assert the original patent while
invoking the doctrine of equivalents, rather than making an
application for reissue. This is unfortunate for competitors,
because reissue patents preserve the notice function of claims
whereas the doctrine of equivalents does not.52 The tension
between the doctrine of equivalents and reissue provisions has
been recognized frequently by the courts.53
A. Reissue Can Convert a Case of Infringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents to a Case of Literal Infringement if the
Equivalent is Disclosed but Unclaimed
In a case where an equivalent is disclosed but unclaimed in the
original patent, literal infringement of the original patent is not
possible. If the doctrine of equivalents were allowed to reach
disclosed but unclaimed equivalents, then the patent holder could
prevail in an infringement action under the doctrine of equivalents.
However, reissue proceedings followed by an infringement action,
under a theory of literal infringement of the reissued claims, may
be an alternative in this situation. Claims of a reissue patent, like
all claims, must be supported by disclosure in the original
application.54 Furthermore, claims of a reissue patent must not
50

See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
See id.
52
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 61516, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 333 (Black, J., dissenting) (1950); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting) (Fed. Cir. 1995).
53
See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615-16, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 333 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
54
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994) (“The provisions of this title relating to applications
51
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broaden the scope of coverage in any respect unless filed within
two years after the issuance of the original patent.55 Assertion of
the original patent under the doctrine of equivalents does not have
this time constraint.56
B. Competitors Have Notice of the Possible Scope and Extent of
Reissue a priori as Well as Notice and Limited Participatory
Rights in a Reissue Proceeding
Reissue preserves the notice function of claims for several
reasons. First, the extent of possible reissue claims, whether
broadened or not, is known a priori to competitors by inspection of
the original disclosure.57 Second, the time limit for application of
broadening reissues gives competitors certainty that broadened
claims will not be possible after a fixed time.58 Third, an applicant
for a reissue patent cannot recapture subject matter that was
surrendered during prosecution of the original patent.59 Thus,
while reissue removes some of the certainty and precision from
original patent claims, reissue does so in a controlled manner that
preserves predictability to a large extent.

for patent shall be applicable to applications for reissue of a patent . . . .”). See also
Application of Hay, 534 F.2d 917, 919, 189 U.S.P.Q. 790 (C.C.P.A 1976).
55
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
56
See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting).
57
But cf. J. Christopher Carraway, The Uncertain Future of Enforcing Patents that
have been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 63, 70-75 (1998) (arguing that
reissue provisions conflict with the notice function of precise claiming during the two
years after issuance, when claims are subject to change in a reissue proceeding).
58
See id.
59
See Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1436, 221 U.S.P.Q. 289, 295 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)
The recapture rule bars the patentee from acquiring, through reissue, claims that
are of the same or of broader scope than those claims that were canceled from
the original application. On the other hand, the patentee is free to acquire,
through reissue, claims that are narrower in scope than the canceled claims. If
the reissue claims are narrower than the canceled claims, yet broader than the
original patent claims, reissue must be sought within 2 years after grant of the
original patent. (footnotes omitted).
Id.; see also In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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C. Reissue Law is the Appropriate Vehicle to Compromise the
Competing Policies at Stake
The competing policies at play in reissue law include tolerance
of some imperfection in original patents, fairness to competitors
who have relied on original patent claims, and efficient operations
of the PTO.60 For example, the two-year limit for seeking
broadened claims is Congress’ choice for balancing the first two
policy interests, and intervening rights directly concern the second.
These competing policies are important ones that need to be
addressed.61 Though some commentators are critical of the way
reissue law balances these policies,62 reissue law provides the
framework in which these policies can best be balanced. The
doctrine of equivalents, on the other hand, is an awkward
framework for satisfactorily addressing these important policy
concerns.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR
ONLY EQUIVALENTS THAT ARISE AFTER FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
APPLICATION FOR PATENT
A. Equivalents Known at the Time of Filing of the Original
Application for Patent Can and Should be Disclosed and
Claimed
“Equivalents” known at the time of filing of an original patent
application can be disclosed. The terminology here deserves
explanation. It is not typical to refer to an “equivalent” at the time
of filing. “Equivalents” are the subject of infringement analysis
long after filing. An equivalent at the time of filing would more
60
Cf. In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The
reissue statute balances the purpose of providing the patentee with an opportunity to
correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the public interest in finality and certainty
of patent rights.”) (citing Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 100 (1885)).
61
See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1994). See also Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating and
Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. 357 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
62
See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 800
(1998) (citing Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in
Patent Law: Questions Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (1989)). See
also Carraway, supra note 57 at 90-91.
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likely be referred to as a “variation” or “alternative embodiment”
of the invention, and that is what is meant herein by the term
“equivalent” in the context of the time of filing, i.e., a variation or
alternative to the invention that would later be asserted as an
equivalent in an infringement context. By simply describing the
equivalents as alternative embodiments in the original patent
application, so long as the description conforms with the
requirements of section 112 of Title 35 of the U.S.C., first
paragraph, the equivalents can be claimed in the original
application and perhaps in a later reissue patent application as well.
As a practical matter for the patent drafter, it is good practice to
disclose alternative embodiments liberally. In so doing, the drafter
is better able to generalize the various disclosed embodiments to
arrive at a broad claim. Disclosure of alternative embodiments
also affords the patent prosecutor flexibility to avoid prior art cited
by the patent examiner. Finally, liberal disclosure is advantageous
for defensive reasons. When the patent issues, the disclosure
becomes prior art (as of its filing date) that can preclude others
from patenting what is disclosed.63 On the other hand, failure to
disclose an alternative embodiment, if it is separately patentable,
leaves open the possibility that another will invent the alternative
embodiment and patent it himself.
B. Disclosed But Unclaimed Equivalents Can and Should be
Claimed in a Reissue Patent Under Appropriate
Circumstances
If an equivalent is disclosed in an original patent application, it
can be claimed in a later reissue patent application, regardless of
the scope of the reissue patent claims, provided the reissue
application is filed within two years from the issuance of the
original patent,64 and there is no attempt to recapture subject matter
surrendered during the original prosecution. If claiming the
equivalent does not broaden the scope of a claim in the original
patent, then the equivalent can be claimed in a reissue filed
anytime during the term of the original patent.65 To maximize the

63
64
65

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1994).
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).

PHILLIPS.FINAL

170

12/28/00 7:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:155

opportunity for tailoring patent claims during reissue, it is
important to obtain broad claims in the original patent.
C. Disclosed But Unclaimed Embodiments Should be Barred
From the Doctrine of Equivalents
Various thoughts have emerged from the bench regarding the
relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and disclosed but
unclaimed embodiments of the invention. Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. The Linde Air Products Co.66 (hereinafter
“Graver Tank”) entertained and dismissed the proposal that the
doctrine of equivalents should be limited to only that which is
disclosed in the patent specification.67 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.68 (hereinafter “Warner-Jenkinson”)
reiterated that dismissal.69 On the other hand, the much more
recent case of Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc.70 (hereinafter “Maxwell”)
held that an embodiment that is disclosed but unclaimed is barred
from the doctrine of equivalents,71 although the holding of
Maxwell has been limited by YBM Magnex v. U.S. International
Trade Commission72 (hereinafter “YBM”). It is difficult to
reconcile Maxwell and YBM.73 The better reasoned holding is that
of Maxwell. Both cases are described in detail below.
1. Maxwell v. Baker
In Maxwell, the patent in suit was directed at a system for
attaching together mated pairs of shoes. As claimed, Maxwell’s
(the inventor) invention comprised an integral fastening tab having
two parts.74 The first part of the fastening tab was secured between
the inner sole and outer sole inside the shoe.75 The second part

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950).
Id. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330-31.
520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 (1997).
Id. at 37-38, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874.
86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id.
145 F.3d 1317, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Boalick, supra note 49, at 2394.
See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1102-04, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003-04.
See id.
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extended vertically upward along the shoe upper.76 A filament
extended through apertures in the second parts of the fastening tab
in each shoe of the mated pair.77 Maxwell disclosed, but did not
claim, that the fastening tabs could be attached by being stitched
into a lining seam at the side or back of the shoe, rather than being
attached between the inner and outer soles.78 Aware of Maxwell’s
patent, Baker designed attachment systems just as Maxwell had
described but not claimed, i.e., with fastening tabs stitched along
interior seams, not fastened between the inner and outer soles.79
The Federal Circuit held that Maxwell was not entitled to a
range of equivalents that included the disclosed but unclaimed
embodiment.80 In support of this holding, Judge Lourie cited the
“well-established rule that ‘subject matter disclosed but not
claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public.’”81 The
rationale for this rule is to prevent patent applicants from filing
narrow claims, thereby avoiding examination, and then seeking to
enlarge the claim scope through the doctrine of equivalents.82 This
argument has the flavor of estoppel. The premise of the argument
is that a patentee should not get different treatment for her
invention outside the PTO from that had inside the PTO. That is,
if a patent applicant considered her invention to be one
embodiment and not another at the PTO, then she as a patentee
will be held to that choice.83
According to the court, reissue is a statutory exception to this
“well-established” rule.84 Curiously, the court does not articulate
an exception for continuing applications that claim the unclaimed
embodiments. Because such an exception is surely present,85 the
term “unclaimed” in this context must be understood to be
76

See id.
See id.
78
See id. at 1106.
79
See id. at 1103.
80
See id. at 1106.
81
Id. at 1106 (citing Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1500, 1504 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
See id.
85
See In re Gibbs and Griffin, 437 F.2d 486, 493 n.6, 168 U.S.P.Q. 578, 584 n.6
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (“A modicum of thought will demonstrate, as can be seen from the cases
we are discussing herein, that the public does not necessarily get free use of an invention
merely because in a particular patent it is disclosed and not claimed. It may be and often
is claimed in another patent.”).
77
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unclaimed at all, not just unclaimed in the individual patent in suit.
Claiming an alternative embodiment in a continuing application
avoids the reach of the rule. This result is consistent with the
rationale of the rule, because the filing of multiple applications to
claim multiple embodiments does not signal that the applicant
regards only limited embodiments to be her invention.
Maxwell explains why Graver Tank is consistent with the rule
that disclosed but unclaimed embodiments cannot be equivalents.86
In Graver Tank, the accused composition, a welding flux
comprising manganese silicate, was disclosed in the patent in suit87
(the “‘960 patent”) but not within the literal scope of the disputed
claims, which required an “alkaline earth metal silicate” (which
manganese silicate is not).88 The Court found infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank and, in doing so, gave
weight to the findings in the record that prior art to the ‘960 patent
disclosed the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes.89 The
Federal Circuit in Maxwell distinguished the facts before it over
Graver Tank by noting that the ‘960 patent in Graver Tank
contained broader claims than those at issue on appeal.90 The
broader claims read on welding fluxes containing manganese
silicates, but the broader claims were earlier held invalid as
embracing many inoperative cases.91 Thus, the equivalent was
“claimed,” though not validly, and even invalid claims are
sufficient to escape the well-established rule that bars equivalents
extending to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.92 Focusing
the rule on issued claims, rather than valid claims, is consistent
with the rationale of the rule. Issued claims, even if later held
invalid, are fully examined by the PTO and represent what the
applicant regards as her invention.

86

1996).
87

See Maxwell, 86 F.3d 1098, 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1006-07 (Fed. Cir.

U.S. Patent 2,043,960.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 610, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950).
89
See id.
90
See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006-07.
91
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod., Inc., 336 U.S. 271, 277, 80 U.S.P.Q.
451, 453 (1949), aff’d, 339 U.S. at 607, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 328.
92
See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1107, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1007.
88

PHILLIPS.FINAL

2000]

12/28/00 7:08 PM

TAKING A STEP BEYOND MAXWELL

173

2. YBM Magnex v. International Trade Commission
The “well-established” rule invoked in Maxwell was limited by a
totally diverse panel of the Federal Circuit in YBM.93 In YBM, the
patentee asserted U.S. Patent 4,588,439 (the “‘439 patent”), which
was directed to a permanent magnet alloy containing various
specified elements including oxygen.94 The ‘439 patent claimed a
magnet alloy with oxygen content in the range of 6,000-35,000
ppm (parts per million).95 However, the ‘439 patent disclosed a
wider range of oxygen content, including a lower range of 5,4006,000 ppm, where the accused alloy lay.96 An administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) at the International Trade Commission (the
“Commission”) found that the accused alloy infringed the ‘439
patent claims under the doctrine of equivalents.97 However, the
Commission, relying on Maxwell, reversed the ALJ’s
determination.98 The Federal Circuit panel then reversed the
Commission.99
In reversing the Commission, the Federal Circuit panel
explained that the “well-established” rule of Maxwell must be
limited to “distinct” embodiments to accord with Supreme Court
precedent in Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson.100 To support its
view, the YBM panel refers to two facets of the Graver Tank case.
First, the YBM panel notes that the district court in the Graver
Tank litigation used the disclosure of manganese silicate as
supporting its conclusion of equivalents.101 Second, the YBM
panel notes that dissenters on the Supreme Court advocated a rule
that unclaimed disclosure is dedicated to the public, yet the
majority failed to adopt such a rule.102 To further support its view,
93

See YBM Magnex, 145 F.3d 1317, 1320-22, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1845-7 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
94
See id. at 1318.
95
See id.
96
See id. at 1319.
97
See id.
98
See id. at 1320.
99
See id. at 1322.
100
See id. at 1321.
101
See id. at 1320.
102
See id. at 1321.
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the YBM panel refers to Warner-Jenkinson, in which the Court
“rejected the . . . proposition that equivalents . . . must be
disclosed.”103
The YBM court’s analysis of Supreme Court precedent is
unconvincing. With respect to the first facet of Graver Tank cited
by the YBM panel, the Supreme Court majority in Graver Tank
never refers to the fact that the specification of the ‘960 patent
discloses the unclaimed manganese silicate ingredient. Although
the trial court relied upon the disclosure, the majority noted other
evidence in upholding the trial court’s finding of equivalents.104
Thus, Graver Tank cannot properly be cited as Supreme Court
precedent for the proposition that disclosure of a feature weighs in
favor of finding that feature to be within the scope of equivalents
to the claims.
With respect to the YBM court’s reference to the dissent’s
positions in Graver Tank, that everything disclosed but unclaimed
in the patent is dedicated to the public, it is improper to say that the
Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court simply failed to
apply the rule in this case. The dissent notes that such a rule is
required by precedent.105 As explained in Maxwell, the facts of
Graver Tank did not implicate the rule because the equivalent at
issue was in fact “claimed.”106
3. Legal Analysis of Precedent Leading up to Maxwell and
YBM is Not Conclusive
Because the holdings of Maxwell and YBM are difficult to
reconcile on their faces, it is worthwhile to examine precedent
addressing the dedication rule. Supreme Court precedent in this
area is scant. The earliest case is Miller v. Brass Co.107
(hereinafter “Miller”). The patent at issue in Miller was a reissue
103
Id. (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
1865, 1874 (1997)).
104
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. 605, 610-11, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 331 (1950) (stating that use
of expert testimony, learned treatises and prior art was “[p]articularly important”).
105
See id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352
(1881); Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 57 U.S.P.Q. 471, 481 (1943)). See also
id. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884)).
106
Maxwell v. J. Baker Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1006-07
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
107
104 U.S. 350 (1881).
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patent that claimed a single dome combustion lamp with a
chimney.108 The original patent, which had been granted fifteen
years before the reissue patent, had claimed a double-dome
combustion lamp without a chimney and described the invention as
an advance over the prior art because a chimney was not needed.109
The Court invalidated the reissue patent and in so doing articulated
the dedication rule: “[T]he claim of a specific device or
combination, and an omission to claim other devices or
combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a
dedication to the public of that which is not claimed.”110 The
Court justified the dedication rule on the grounds that laches
should bar enlargement of claim scope after two years.111 This
requirement was subsequently codified.112
The Miller Court also seems to criticize the adequacy of the
disclosure in the original patent with respect to the reissue claims,
stating “the invention specified in the . . . reissued patent . . . is not
the same invention which was described and claimed in the
original patent.”113 This statement suggests that the reissue patent
claimed new matter not adequately described in the original patent
disclosure. If true, then the dedication rule would be dictum in
Miller.
Subsequent cases cite Miller in two divergent ways. In the first
line of cases, Miller is cited for the general dedication rule under
various circumstances. These circumstances include the same
reissue context, as reaffirmed in Mahn v. Harwood114 (hereinafter
“Mahn”) (“We deem it proper, therefore, to say, once for all, that
the views announced in Miller v. The Brass Company on the
subject of reissuing patents for the purpose of expanding and
enlarging the claim, were deliberately expressed and are still
adhered to.”).115 Another circumstance in which the dedication
rule has been invoked is claim construction.116 Finally, the
108

Id. at 351.
See id.
110
Id. at 352.
111
See id.
112
See 35 U.S.C. § 251.
113
Miller, 104 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
114
112 U.S. 354 (1884).
115
Id. at 358.
116
See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1500, 1504
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
109
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dedication rule has been applied as a limit to the doctrine of
equivalents.117
Brunswick Corp. v. United States118 (hereinafter “Brunswick”) is
a case in the last category. In Brunswick, the claims at issue were
directed at a radar camouflage screen and a recited resistivity
“between . . .100 ohms and . . .1000 ohms but considerably
different from 377 ohms.”119 The accused radar screens had a
resistivity between 74 and 87 ohms.120 The patent specification
contained a table disclosing the accused range.121 The Brunswick
majority applied Maxwell directly,122 and Judge Newman wrote a
dissent that previewed almost exactly her majority opinion in
YBM.123 Both Brunswick and YBM involved numerical ranges and
are extremely difficult to reconcile,124 except for the fact that
Brunswick is non-precedential. YBM, as noted above, attempts to
draw a distinction on the basis of whether the disclosed but
unclaimed subject matter is a distinct embodiment from what is
claimed.125
Another line of cases emphasizes the fact that Miller involved an
inadequate disclosure. In Application of Hay,126 an applicant for a
reissue patent sought to introduce new matter into the reissue
patent application so as to satisfy the best mode requirement.127
The court held that traditional notions of new matter apply to
reissue applications.128 The court distinguished Miller, noting that
in Miller, “the reissue corrected or clarified matter which had
already been disclosed but in a defective fashion.”129 Similarly,
YBM cites Miller as a case in which “the original patent did not

117
See, e.g., Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (1996); Brunswick Corp.
v. United States, 152 F.3d 946 (table), 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1446, 1449-50, 1998 WL 163700,
at *4 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion).
118
Brunswick, 152 F.3d 946 (table), 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1446.
119
Brunswick, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448.
120
See id. at 1449.
121
See id. at 1450.
122
See id.
123
See id. at 1454.
124
See Boalick, supra note 49 at 2394.
125
See YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 145 F.3d 1317, 1321, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
126
534 F.2d 917, 189 U.S.P.Q. 790 (C.C.P.A 1976).
127
Id. at 918-19, 189 U.S.P.Q. at 791.
128
See id. at 919.
129
Id. at 920.
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describe the subject matter for which reissue was sought.”130
Under this view, Miller disclosed too little rather than too much.
Whatever view of Miller is taken, Mahn is Supreme Court
precedent in support of the dedication rule in a reissue context.131
Given that the dedication rule exists as a sound proposition of law
in at least the reissue context, and perhaps claim construction, the
issue is whether it rightfully extends to the doctrine of equivalents.
An argument in support of this extension can be based on the
rationale for the dedication rule. The primary rationale for the
dedication rule is that patentees should not be able to assert patent
rights broader than what the PTO examined, when there was an
opportunity to obtain examination of claims covering the asserted
rights.132 Another rationale is public notification.133 Both
rationales support extension of the dedication rule to the doctrine
of equivalents.134
However, there exists precedent for allowing patentees to apply
the doctrine of equivalents to reach disclosed but unclaimed
subject matter. As pointed out in YBM, these cases include
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.135 (hereinafter “Uniroyal”),
Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon, Inc.136 (hereinafter “Miles
Labs”), Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.137 (hereinafter
“Pall”), and Modine Manufacturing Co. v. U.S. International
Trade Commission138 (hereinafter “Modine”). In Uniroyal, the
130

YBM Magnex, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1847. Cf. Mark V. Hurwitz, YBM Magnex, Inc.
v. International Trade Commission, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 191, 191-92 (1999)
(proposing that “the presence of disclosed but unclaimed matter should bar the
availability of the doctrine of equivalents . . . only when, as in Miller, the patentee
explicitly distinguishes his invention from the disclosed but unclaimed matter”).
131
See Mahn, 112 U.S. 354 (1884).
132
See Maxwell, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001. See also Int’l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal
Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1588, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J.,
concurring); Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
1161, 1167-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing North Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7
F.3d, 1571, 1577, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (However, North American
Vaccine does not support the proposition for which Genentech cites it. North American
Vaccine states in the context of claim construction that claims should not be construed to
cover what is neither disclosed nor enabled.)); Unique Concepts, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1504;
Boalick, supra note 49, at 2382.
133
See Mahn, 112 U.S. at 361.
134
See Boalick, supra note 49, at 2382, 2384.
135
939 F.2d 1540, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
136
997 F.2d 870, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
137
66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
138
75 F.3d 1545, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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claim at issue recited a specific numerical value of “approximately
0.7,”139 but the specification disclosed a broader range of 0.5 to
0.9.140 The Uniroyal court upheld a finding of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents of an accused device while citing the
patent’s disclosure of the broader range as supporting the finding
of equivalence.141 In Miles Labs, the claims at issue recited a
“single cabinet,”142 while the accused device consisted of three
cabinets.143 However, the patent specification mentioned that
“separate cabinets” could be used,144 and the Miles Labs court
upheld a finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.145
Modine is another case involving numerical ranges. In Modine,
the claims recited a “relatively small hydraulic diameter.”146 A
parent application to the patent at issue disclosed a preferred
hydraulic diameter of 0.015 - 0.070 inches and the patent disclosed
a graph showing this broader range; however, the claim at issue
narrowed this range to 0.015 - 0.040 inches.147 The patent also
incorporated by reference a document disclosing a hydraulic
diameter up to 0.07 inches.148 The accused devices had hydraulic
diameters in the range 0.040 - 0.070 inches, i.e., outside the literal
claimed range but within the disclosed range.149 The patentee
argued that the disclosure supports a range of equivalents up to
0.070 inches.150 Without directly answering this argument, the
Federal Circuit held that the patentee was estopped from asserting
a range of equivalents having a hydraulic diameter above 0.04822
inches, due to amendments to avoid prior art.151 The Federal
Circuit remanded the case for determination of infringement by
equivalency within the permissible range of equivalents.152

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Uniroyal, 939 F.2d at 1544.
Id. at 1544 n.3.
See id. at 1544.
Miles Lab., 997 F.2d at 876.
Id.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Modine, 75 F.3d at 1549.
See id. at 1552.
See id. at 1553.
See id. at 1554.
See Modine, 75 F.3d at 1551.
See id. at 1551-52, 1556.
See id. at 1556.
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Unlike the three cases just discussed, Pall does not support the
proposition for which YBM cites it. In Pall, the claim recited a
numerical range of “about 5:1 to about 7:1,”153 while the numerical
value in the accused device was 4:1.154 A first-filed patent
specification broadly described the invention without numerical
limits; however, a subsequent continuation-in-part application
added the range limitation in the claims after the inventor
conducted additional research and determined, to the best of his
knowledge, that the invention was operable only in the claimed
range.155 Thus, the alleged equivalent numerical value of 4:1 was
neither disclosed nor enabled in the patent at issue. Although there
was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in Pall, it is not
a case where the claims were narrower than the disclosure, as YBM
states. In fact, Pall is a case where the equivalent resulted from
after-arising technology, as developments subsequent to the patent
filing made commercially available material having the numerical
value of 4:1.156
Setting aside the Pall decision, Uniroyal, Miles Labs and
Modine are three examples where the doctrine of equivalents was
allowed without restraint by the dedication rule. However, none of
the defendants in these cases raised a challenge under the
dedication rule. The courts in these cases did not raise the
dedication rule sue sponte, but one wonders if the outcomes would
have been different had the defendants raised the dedication rule.
In the absence of a direct challenge, it is difficult to say that these
cases test the limits of the dedication rule.
In summary, both Maxwell and YBM find some support in
precedent. Because YBM was decided by a panel, Maxwell, as the
earlier decided case, is binding to the extent that the two cases are
in conflict.157 However, YBM arguably limits Maxwell rather than
conflicts with Maxwell. The limitation is that only distinct
embodiments that are disclosed but unclaimed are dedicated
subject matter.

153

Pall, 66 F.3d at 1217.
Id.
155
See id. at 1219.
156
See id.
157
See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (“[W]here there are conflicting precedents, the earlier precedent controls.”).
154
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4. As a Normative Matter, the Dedication Rule Should Not be
Limited to Distinct Embodiments
YBM, though technically defendable under precedent, attempts
to draw a distinction that is dangerous. It is not clear what makes
an embodiment “distinct.” The only guidance on this point from
the YBM opinion is that systems for attaching together mated pairs
are distinct when the attachment tags connect to different parts of
the shoe, but that different numerical ranges are not distinct.158
This line of reasoning has the potential of disparate impacts on
different fields of technology. This line of reasoning may render
mechanical variations, in general, as being more often viewed as
distinct embodiments, but chemical variations, which are often
numerical ranges in a composition, as not being distinct
embodiments. The issue of whether a given alternative is distinct
or not will undoubtedly become a contested issue in many future
cases, if the distinctiveness distinction is allowed to stand.
Because Maxwell is better supported by direct precedent and its
rationale, and because YBM’s distinctiveness criterion is likely too
difficult to apply without considerable arbitrariness, the courts or
Congress should overrule YBM and reaffirm as a bright line rule
that disclosed but unclaimed features of the invention, whether
distinct or not, are barred from the doctrine of equivalents.
D. Proposal: Only in the Case Where an Equivalent Could Not
Possibly Have Been Disclosed in the Original Application for
Patent is the Extra Protection of the Doctrine of Equivalents a
Sound Policy
Taking one step beyond the recommendation above would
resolve much of the dissatisfaction with the doctrine of
equivalents. The needed additional step is to impute to a patent
applicant knowledge of the prior art for the purpose of determining
what she regards as her invention. That is, the dedication rule
applied in Maxwell should be broadened to bar from equivalents
unclaimed features that were disclosed or could have been
disclosed by virtue of being known in the art at the time of
158
See YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 145 F.3d 1317, 1320, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1843, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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filing.159 Put another way, the doctrine of equivalents should be
barred from reaching all but later arising equivalents.
This proposal would have many benefits to the patent system. In
particular, the proposal would reinvigorate the notice function of
claims, attenuate difficulties with the doctrine of equivalents,
encourage liberal disclosure by patentees, make reissue
proceedings more important in patent enforcement, and preserve
for “pioneer” inventions a deservedly larger range of equivalents.
These and other points are discussed in the following subsections.
1. The Proposal Would Reinvigorate the Notice Function of
Claims
Limiting the doctrine of equivalents to after-arising equivalents
would strengthen the notice function of claims. The scope and
content of both the disclosure and the prior art to the patent can be
objectively determined by a competitor. The disclosure is a matter
of public record. The prior art to the patent is fixed and can be
investigated to whatever extent a competitor is willing to expend
resources to do so. The prior art that is presumptively most
relevant is, in fact, a part of the public record of the patent.160
Although cases would arise in which a jury would decide a factual
question about the scope and content of the prior art, that is exactly
an issue that is regularly determined in anticipation and
obviousness disputes, and, consequently, one that the courts and
the bar are accustomed to handling.161
Given the disclosure and the scope and content of the prior art, it
is straightforward to determine whether an accused equivalent is
one that arises after the patent filing or not. The bar against all but
later rising equivalents would be the judicial tool of first resort to
prevent overreaching of the doctrine of equivalents. Because
159
Cf. Jason Schultz, Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries,
Inc. & Dawn Equipment Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 173, 189
(1999) (proposing a more flexible and equitable “reason to know” standard rather than
simple existence in the context of the contemporary technology rule for the doctrine of
equivalents for claim elements in means-plus-function form).
160
See The Honorable Paul R. Michel and Lisa Schneider, Side Bar: Vitronics – Some
Unanswered Questions in CHISUM, supra note 39, at 1101. Cf. Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
161
See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459 (1966) (“Under § 103,
the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined.”).
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fewer issues of equivalents would get over this bar, the precise
language of the claims would take on greater significance.
Competitors could rely on the precise language of the claims
except in relatively well-defined cases of after-arising technology.
2. The Proposal Would Attenuate the Confusing Legal
Morass Surrounding the Doctrine of Equivalents, Thus
Providing for More Efficient Resolution of Patent Disputes
Because the bar against all but later rising equivalents would be
a significant gatekeeper to the doctrine of equivalents, the
significance of related doctrines such as prosecution history
estoppel, prior art limitations and the all-elements rule would be
diminished. First, these related doctrines would simply be
implicated less often – only when the equivalents are after-arising.
Prosecution history estoppel would rarely be applicable to afterarising technology, because prosecution history often involves
amendments and remarks concerning the prior art and patentability
over the prior art. Furthermore, prior art limitations would
probably never be relevant in cases of after-arising limitation. The
all-elements rule, on the other hand, would be equally relevant
regardless of whether the equivalent is old or new.
3. The Proposal Would Appropriately Encourage Liberal
Disclosure in Original Patent Applications
One of the fundamental policies animating the patent laws is the
importance of disclosure of technology.162 A defect in the
dedication rule from Maxwell is that it discourages disclosure. The
proposal to bar everything known at the time of filing a patent
application cures this defect. Under the proposal, failure to
disclose what is known in the art at the time of filing would not
save a patentee from the bar against equivalents. To the contrary,
the proposal would encourage patent drafters to cover with claims
as many features from the prior art that can be combined with core
patentable elements of the invention. To support such claims,
broad disclosure would be needed.
162
See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 39, at 1 (citing DONALD S. CHISUM
JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1-2 n.1 (1992)).
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PHILLIPS.FINAL

2000]

12/28/00 7:08 PM

TAKING A STEP BEYOND MAXWELL

183

Furthermore, because the proposal would place more importance
on reissue of patents, as discussed below, the proposal would make
it more prudent for patent drafters to include generous disclosure
of optional and alternative features of the invention to provide
support for claims to those features in a reissue patent. Of course,
disclosure to most prior art technology can be easily and succinctly
accomplished by the technique of incorporation by reference.163
4. The Proposal Would Make Reissue Proceedings More
Important in Patent Enforcement
Reissue patents would take on a greater importance because
defective claims (i.e., ones that are literally too narrow) could not
be expanded by the doctrine of equivalents unless the equivalent
was after-arising. In all other cases where the literal scope of
claims is inadequate, reissue proceedings would be necessary for
enforcement of a broadened patent right. Perhaps as a result of the
proposal’s de-emphasis of the doctrine of equivalents and
corresponding added emphasis on reissue, the two year time limit
for seeking broadened reissue claims should be extended.
Congress can determine the appropriate time limit by balancing the
equitable interests of patent holders and competitors at risk of
infringement.
5. The Proposal Would Provide “Pioneer” Inventions with a
Deservedly Larger Range of Equivalents
“Pioneer” inventions are generally thought of as those inventions
that have been preceded by very little prior art.164 Because pioneer
inventions represent relatively large leaps in technological
progress, courts have been willing to afford them greater
protection.165 Of course, the shortage of prior art to a pioneer
invention makes possible claims having broad literal scope.
Notwithstanding broad literal claim scope, courts have been
163

See generally Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 608.01(p), 7th ed. (1998).
See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner et al., The Future of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26
AIPLA Q.J. 277, 323 (1998) (citing John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent
Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH L.J. 35 (1995)).
165
See, e.g., Shields v. Halliburton Co., 667 F.2d 1232, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1066 (5th Cir.
1982); John Zinck Co. v. Nat’l Airoil Burner Co., 196 U.S.P.Q. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
164
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willing to allow broad play in the doctrine of equivalents for
pioneer inventions.166 Prior art limitations to the doctrine of
equivalents certainly do not restrain the scope of equivalents for a
pioneer invention.
The proposal to limit the doctrine of
equivalents to after-arising equivalents would limit equivalents for
pioneer inventions very little, if at all, because almost all
technology related to a pioneer invention is after-arising.
6. The Proposal Would Harmonize Doctrine of Equivalents
Analysis Whether or Not Means-Plus-Function Claiming is
Utilized
When an element of a claim is recited in means-plus-function
form, a type of equivalents (structural equivalents) is included
within the literal scope of the claim.167 Structural equivalents
differ from equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”)
in that structural equivalents must perform an identical function,168
whereas a DOE equivalent need only perform a function that is
substantially the same.169 A structural equivalent also must be
available at the time of issuance,170 whereas a DOE equivalent can
result from after-arising technology.171 Thus, when there is no
literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim and the
similarity of function is not at issue, the doctrine of equivalents is
limited to only after-arising technology,172 much like the extended
dedication rule proposed here.

166

See, e.g., Shields, 667 F.2d at 1238, 216 U.S.P.Q. at 1071 (“[A] pioneer patent [is]
entitled to a liberal range of equivalents.”); John Zinck, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 558 (“[The]
patent qualifies as a pioneer patent. . . . A liberal construction of the breadth of the
patent’s scope is, therefore, appropriate under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
167
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
168
See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus.,
Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
169
See id. 174 F.3d at 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1168 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) and Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S.,
140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
170
See id. (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145
F.3d 1303, 1310, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
171
See id.
172
See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d 1303, 1310.
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7. The Proposal is Consistent with the Rule that Equivalents
are Determined at the Time of Infringement
Equivalents are determined at the time of infringement.173 The
proposal is consistent with this rule. After-arising equivalents, by
definition, are known at the time of infringement but not
necessarily any sooner. In stating this rule, Warner-Jenkinson
explicitly set forth that after-arising equivalents should be within
the scope of available equivalents, subject to the other pertinent
limitations.174
8. The Proposal Rightfully Encourages Careful Drafting of
Patent Applications
A disadvantage of the proposal is that it places a greater
importance on patent drafting and, consequently, higher costs on
patent drafting, because the patent drafter must be careful to claim
and disclose as much as possible.175 This raises concern that
patenting, which is already expensive, may become unaffordable
for applicants with limited funding, such as some individual
unaffiliated inventors and very small companies. This concern was
recently addressed by the Federal Circuit:
[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public
at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of
its claimed structure. [citations omitted] This court
recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on
forethought in patent drafting. Indeed this premium may
lead to higher costs of patent prosecution. However, the
alternative rule – allowing broad play for the doctrine of
equivalents to encompass foreseeable variations, not just
of a claim element, but of a patent claim – also leads to
higher costs. Society at large would bear these latter
costs in the form of virtual foreclosure of competitive
activity within the penumbra of each issued patent claim.
173
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1874 (1997).
174
See id.
175
See Schultz, supra note 159, at 189 (discussing “equivalents searches”).
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Because the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line of
demarcation between infringing and non-infringing
activity, it creates a zone of uncertainty, into which
competitors tread only at their peril. [citation omitted]
Given a choice of imposing the higher costs of careful
prosecution on patentees, or imposing the costs of
foreclosed business activity on the public at large, this
court believes the costs are properly imposed on the
group best positioned to determine whether or not a
particular invention warrants investment at a higher
level, that is the patentees.176
V. OTHER ATTEMPTS TO REACH THE SAME RESULT HAVE FAILED
The proposal to limit the doctrine of equivalents to after-arising
technology is not new.177 The proposal has been made before with
a justification based on similarities with structural equivalents of
means-plus-function claim elements.178 As noted in section 6 of
Part IV, supra, DOE equivalents are sometimes limited to afterarising technology for claim elements in means-plus-function
form. In Kraft Foods, Inc. v. International Trading Co., the
accused infringer tried to extend this rule to non-means-plus
function elements.179 However, the Federal Circuit declined,
explicitly stating that “infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is not limited to technology arising after the issuance
of the patent.”180
This attempt was properly rejected. The rule that DOE
equivalents in a means-plus-function claim are sometimes limited
to after-arising technology is based on judicial economy.181
176

Sage Products, 126 F.3d 1420, 1425, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1103, 1107-08 (emphasis
added).
177
See, e.g., Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
178
See id.
179
See id.
180
Id. at 1371 (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1464-65, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“rejecting argument that doctrine of equivalents
should be limited to after-arising equivalents, since ‘known interchangeability is often
synonymous with equivalence’”)).
181
See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]hy should the issue of equivalence have to be litigated a
second time?”).
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Because an analysis of structural equivalents for an element of a
means-plus-function claim always precedes an analysis of DOE
equivalents, and because the analysis of structural equivalents
considers everything possibly equivalent up to the time of grant,
then consideration of DOE equivalents from the same time period
(assuming identical functions) would give the patentee “two bites
at the apple.”182 This rationale is simply not present when the
claim is not in means-plus-function form. That is, the concern of
Chiuminatta Concrete is not a reason to limit the doctrine of
equivalents to after-arising technology generally. Rather, the more
encompassing policy concerns listed in Part IV, supra, are
appropriate reasons to limit the doctrine of equivalents to afterarising technology generally.183
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents will be tamed one way or another.
The major battle over the doctrine was fought in WarnerJenkinson, and the doctrine survived. Still, the doctrine’s friction
with the notice function of precise claiming remains, and reissue
proceedings are underutilized. Under the current paradigm,
attempts to tame the doctrine of equivalents take the forms of the
arbitrary all-elements rule, the much maligned doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel, and the awkward analysis of
hypothetical claims compared to prior art. A reinvigorated and
augmented dedication rule offers a better approach. First, YBM
should be expressly overruled, so that the dedication rule would
apply regardless of whether the disclosed but unclaimed aspects of
the invention are distinct from the claimed aspects. Otherwise, the
dedication rule is likely to take an undesirable arbitrary quality.
Second, and more importantly, the dedication rule should be
extended to aspects of the invention that could have been disclosed
at the time of filing. The first step can be taken by an en banc
Federal Circuit to resolve conflicting precedent. The second step
is best taken by Congress, because it treads where there is no
182

Kraft Foods, 203 F.3d at 1372, 1373 (quoting Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1311).
These concerns are: (1) the notice function of claims; (2) legal uncertainties
surrounding the doctrine of equivalents; (3) encouragement of liberal disclosure; (4)
proper utilization of reissue proceedings; (5) protection of pioneer inventions; (6)
harmonization with means-plus-function style claiming; (7) determination of equivalence
at the time of infringement; and (8) having the cost borne by patent applicants.
183
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precedent. The result of this approach would be a doctrine of
equivalents that is available only for equivalents resulting from
after-arising technology. This result would benefit the patent
system in a number of ways, including preservation of much of the
notice function of claims, added importance to reissue law,
encouragement of liberal disclosure by patent applicants, a
deservedly greater range of equivalents for pioneer inventions, and
a harmonious doctrine of equivalents whether or not means-plusfunction claiming is present.

